Over the last 20 years, sex offender policies, specifically in terms of community corrections, have increased in scope. One of the most controversial and pervasive sex offender policies is that of registration. In response to the consumption of already limited resources, jurisdictions have imposed increasingly higher community supervision fees onto the offenders, requiring them to pay for their own re-entry. However, to date no research study has examined the statutory language associated with registration fees collected post release from formal community (...) sanctions. Using a statutory analysis within the United States, this research finds and quantifies the imposition of a registration fee on offenders who are legally compelled to pay these registration costs, regardless of whether they are still currently under community supervision. Results show that more than half of U.S. states (n = 28) incorporate statutory language authorizing registration fees, ranging anywhere from $5 per registration to up to $250 per year. These findings, as well as suggestions for future research and policy recommendations, are discussed. (shrink)

This paper engages with the idea at the core of my co‐symposiast's paper ‘Ethics of Substance’ : that the Aristotelian concept of substantial being has ethical implications, and an alternative understanding of existence in terms of affecting and being affected will help us more easily to accommodate relational values, which are thought to sit uneasily within the Aristotelian framework.I focus on two questions. First, is there really is a tension between an Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and concern for others? The (...) answer depends on how we understand the relation between my valuing something indeterminate but determinable and my valuing the particular way in which that determinable is contingently determined. I agree that Carpenter is correct in identifying the tension she does.Second, does the alternative Buddhist influenced view of what it is to exist shift our attention from ethical values such as independence and autonomy onto interpersonal and relational values? I consider an example which reflects another aspect of Aristotle's outlook: his account of the ontological status of the simple material elements. I suggest that once we abandon the idea that such elements exist in virtue of specific intrinsic structures, then questions about their persistence through the changes by reference to which they are identified at the very least admit of no determinate answer. This suggestion also supports the line taken in Carpenter's paper. (shrink)

Stephen Makin presents a clear and accurate new translation of an influential and much-discussed part of Aristotle's philosophical system, accompanied by an analytical and critical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Book Theta of the Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the concepts of actuality and potentiality---which were to remain central to philosophical analysis into the modern era---and explores the distinction between the actual and the potential.

A lively topic of debate in decision theory over recent years concerns our understanding of the different risk attitudes exhibited by decision makers. There is ample evidence that risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviours are widespread, and a growing consensus that such behaviour is rationally permissible. In the context of clinical medicine, this matter is complicated by the fact that healthcare professionals must often make choices for the benefit of their patients, but the norms of rational choice are conventionally grounded in a (...) decision maker’s own desires, beliefs and actions. The presence of both doctor and patient raises the question of whose risk attitude matters for the choice at hand and what to do when these diverge. Must doctors make risky choices when treating risk-seeking patients? Ought they to be risk averse in general when choosing on behalf of others? In this paper, I will argue that healthcare professionals ought to adopt a deferential approach, whereby it is the risk attitude of the patient that matters in medical decision making. I will show how familiar arguments for widely held anti-paternalistic views about medicine can be straightforwardly extended to include not only patients’ evaluations of possible health states, but also their attitudes to risk. However, I will also show that this deferential view needs further refinement: patients’ higher-order attitudes towards their risk attitudes must be considered in order to avoid some counterexamples and to accommodate different views about what sort of attitudes risk attitudes actually are. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of the arguments Aristotle offers in "Metaphysics" 9.4, 1047b14-30, for the two modal theses [1] if (if A is the case then B is the case) then (if A is possible then B is possible) [2] if (if A is possible then B is possible) then (if A is the case then B is the case) Aristotle's arguments for these theses have not typically impressed commentators. I offer two arguments which are relatively faithful to Aristotle's (...) text. The arguments rest on the following pair of claims concerning conditionals and possibility respectively [COND] 'if A then B' is true if and only if in any circumstances in which A obtains, B obtains also [TEST] 'possibly A' is true in a range of circumstances C1... $\text{C}_{\text{n}}$ if and only if assuming A true in any C1 gives rise to no impossibilities, once any further required adjustments are taken into account The arguments and the premises on which they rest are stated without formalisation of the theses [1] and [2]. The argument for [1] is a defensible and persuasive argument. The argument for [2] is invalid, though plausible. That is consistent with our differential verdicts on [1] and [2]. [2] appears to be false: the argument provided for [2] explains why Aristotle might nevertheless have asserted it. The aim of the paper is to justify a more positive verdict on Aristotle's arguments than is usual among commentators. (shrink)

The article presents Frege's distinction between Sense and Reference. After a short introduction, it explains the puzzle which gave rise to the distinction; Frege's earlier solution, and his reasons for its later repudiation. The distinction, which embodies Frege's second solution, is then discussed in two phases. The first, which is restricted to proper names, sets out its most basic features. The second discusses 'empty' names; indirect speech, and the distinction for predicates and for complete sentences. Finally, two criticisms, by Russell (...) and by Kripke, are briefly set out. (shrink)

Stephen Makin presents a clear and accurate new translation of an influential and much-discussed part of Aristotle's philosophical system, accompanied by an analytical and critical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Book Theta of the Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the concepts of actuality and potentiality---which were to remain central to philosophical analysis into the modern era---and explores the distinction between the actual and the potential.

In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgements. In much recent philosophical literature, this kind of moral doubt has been analysed in terms of uncertainty in one’s moral beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that moral judgements express a kind of conative attitude, more akin to a desire than a belief. This paper presents a scientifically informed reconciliation of non-cognitivism and moral doubt. The central claim is that attitudinal ambivalence—the degree to which one holds conflicting attitudes towards the same object—can (...) play the role of moral doubt for non-cognitivists. I will demonstrate that ambivalence has all of the features that we would expect it to have in order to play the role of moral doubt. It is gradable, can vary through time, covaries with strength of motivation, and is suitably distinct from the other features of our moral judgements. As well as providing a defence of non-cognitivism, this insight poses a new challenge for the view: deciding how to act under moral ambivalence. (shrink)

I will offer a defence of Anselm's Ontological Argument, building on some suggestions made by Prior. The defence offered avoids one of the objections commonly levelled against the Ontological Argument. I will not consider whether the use of this objection involves a misinterpretation of the argument as put forward by Anselm. It might, for example, be held that the argument of Proslogion 2 is programmatic, and points forward to Prosiogion 3, and arguments given by Anselm in his Reply to Gaunilo. (...) In particular it might be denied that Anselm holds that what is greater about what exists in reality is just that it exists in reality. While what I have to say will start from points made by Prior, I do not intend to suggest that Prior holds that there is a defence possible for Anselm's argument such as I will offer. What I have to say involves emphasizing modal notions, and treating Anselm's argument as a modal argument. Thus it comes down to defending Anselm's argument in Proslogion 3 in preference to the Proslogion 2 argument. (shrink)

This thesis is comprised of four papers that explore the nature and practical implications of moral doubt. It starts from the observation that the appropriate way to understand and handle moral doubt will depend on the nature of our moral judgements themselves. The first and second papers take a cognitivist view of moral judgements and analyse moral doubt in terms of partial degrees of belief in moral propositions. The first, The Relevance of Belief: Subjective Norms Under Empirical and Moral Uncertainty, (...) argues that this form of moral uncertainty is relevant to our choices and that the norms most directly relevant to choice under moral uncertainty are the action-guiding subjective norms of instrumental rationality. The second, Preference and Commitment Under Moral Uncertainty, proposes a particular way of accommodating moral uncertainty within a decision theoretic model of rational choice, and shows that this has substantial advantages over existing alternatives. The third paper, Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-cognitivists, provides an account of moral doubt that is consistent with non-cognitivism, by analysing the phenomenon in terms of ambivalence in one’s moral attitudes. The fourth and final paper, The Balance and Weight of Reasons, draws out some implications of ambivalence, by exploring the way in which the overall weight of reasons are reflected in the preferences of rational agents. (shrink)

In my feature article in this issue, ‘Doctors, patients and risk attitudes’, I argue that considerations of both autonomy and beneficence support the practice of healthcare professionals deferring to their patients’ reflectively endorsed risk attitudes when making decisions under uncertainty.1 The commentaries written in response to this article present many interesting criticisms, limitations and applications of the view, and I am grateful to all of the commentators for their engagement with this topic. I cannot possibly do justice to all of (...) the points they have raised in this brief response, so I will address two common themes that appear in a number of the commentaries: first, whether the view I have proposed goes too far or not far enough in deferring to individual patients; and second, the epistemic challenge that would be faced when trying to put this approach into practice. Theoretical accounts of the link between preferences and either well-being or autonomy face a familiar tension: if well-being or autonomy are tied too closely to individuals’ actual preferences, one must contend with examples of preferences that seem obviously bad for a person or disconnected from their status as …. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhile extant replies to Jonathan Schaffer’s putative counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding have made significant strides against the charge of transitivity failure, the replies pay insufficient attention to the common structure of the counterexamples, overlooking a deeper structural feature that contributes to their prima facie plausibility. Putative counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding, I argue, trade on the distinction between what I call ‘rigid’ and ‘non-rigid’ grounding, and confusion over how rigid and non-rigid grounding react when combined pumps the (...) intuition that the counterexamples’ chained conclusions are false. The rigid/non-rigid grounding distinction also reveals plausible weakening inference rules that have been overlooked in treatments of the logic of grounding. (shrink)

This paper is a reflection on some of Elizabeth Anscombe's influential work on causation, in particular on some comments in her Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge, published as ‘Causality and Determination’. One of Anscombe's major concerns in that paper is the relation between causation and necessitation, and she critically discusses the cast of mind which links causality with some kind of necessary connection or with exceptionless generalisation. In place of a semi-technical analysis of causation, Anscombe identifies the obvious and yet little (...) considered core of the causal relation as follows. (shrink)

The widely held assumption about what motivated On Denoting is irreconcilable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is missing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure passage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overlooked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of this passage is the chief (...) concern of the present paper. Recognizing the critical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible account of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fundamental standpoint underlyingThe Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of language may be misguided. (shrink)

The widely held assumption about what motivated On Denoting is irreconcilable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is missing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure passage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overlooked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of this passage is the chief (...) concern of the present paper. Recognizing the critical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible account of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fundamental standpoint underlyingThe Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of language may be misguided. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to Stephen Makin's response to my previous criticism of his defense of a conceptual ontological argument. (All relevant bibliographical details are provided in this paper.).

This paper is a critique of Stephen Makin's ontological argument. To some extent, the argument of this paper is recapitulated in *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God* (CUP, 1996).

Nicholas Makins proposes that doctors should take a deferential attitude towards their patients’ preferences when making decisions, and this includes their risk attitudes.1 He grounds this proposal in the principles of autonomy and beneficence. Makins appears to hold autonomy as a good in and of itself, and so for him it follows that deferring to patients must also be good. He also seems to hold that the satisfaction of personal preferences inevitably leads to improved well-being, and so deferring to patients’ (...) risk attitudes upholds the principle of beneficence. Unfortunately, Makins explicitly avoids defining well-being. His account seems to ignore the possibility of an objective measure of health that could contravene patient preferences, and therefore, challenge a deferential approach. While it is true that medicine is replete with complex decisions and significant uncertainty which require value judgements to navigate, it is not true medicine is purely about satisfying preferences. Patient preferences should always guide clinical decisions, but it seems to me Makins is making the far stronger claim that a doctor should act as a substitute decision-maker of sorts, doing their best to make the decision as if they were the patient themselves. I would contend this is not a good idea, as it would clearly impact a doctor’s …. (shrink)

Concept of Avidyā in the Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya; a study.

Makins’s analysis of the philosophical justification of decision-making understates and so misinterprets the importance of patient values to ‘the deference principle.’ (Makins N,1, p1) He assesses autonomy and beneficence as two separate arguments in support of deferring to patient preferences, but they only work well considered together. Further, neither the constitutive nor the evidential view of beneficence fully recognises the importance of patient values to understanding the patient’s worldview, which in turn determines what risks and benefits matter most. Revising these (...) arguments enables a much fuller understanding of the importance of patient values to the practice of medicine, which will in turn improve the refinement of the deference principle. Autonomy requires beneficence, and vice versa, for either of them to be sufficient arguments for deferring to patient choices. Focusing on autonomy alone to justify deference overstates the value of choice in and of itself, as good medicine does not pursue just any choices. It seeks informed consent, which means that the choices we truly value are those made while understanding what is importantly relevant to the choice. A well-informed decision includes data about expected side effects and likelihood of beneficial effects; but it also includes knowing the patient’s values and goals. One must know what is actually valuable …. (shrink)

The crisis of the theory of socioeconomic formations has recently become clearly apparent in our social philosophy. Earlier as well, the "formational" approach, with its presumption that the new order has "decisive advantages," caused perceptible epistemological difficulties associated with the effect of "inverted perspective." It followed from the theory that socialist Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cuba were a "whole epoch" ahead of the USA and other developed countries of the West that had preserved the outmoded capitalist order.

The ongoing controversy about sweatshop labor has mainly focused on economic, on the one, and ethical aspects, on the other side. While proponents of sweatshop labor have argued that low wages would attract foreign investments, would create new workplace opportunities and thus improve economic welfare in less-developed countries, opponents of sweatshop labor argue that such treatment of laborers would violate their dignity, and they prompt western buyers to stop this kind of exploitation. However, the arguments in this debate are not (...) new. As we will show, they can be traced back to the early “sweatshop” debate between social reformers and classical liberals in the 19th century. Interestingly, the 19th century debate identified sweatshop labor not as an industrial system but as a social phenomenon which becomes more likely when several social preconditions are fulfilled. It will be shown that the social preconditions identified in this debate determine working conditions till today and can be used to identify industries were sweatshop labor is more likely than in others—even in western countries. (shrink)

The statement of Heinsius that was the reading of all his manuscriptsis described by Henry2 as a mere blunder, and it must surely be so regarded.Henry claims to have examined seventy-four manuscripts, in none of whichdid he find, and more recent commentators and editors, though some3 prefer to adopt the emendation, are unanimous in acknowledging thelack of manuscript support for the change.

T. 1. Ot antichnoĭ fiziki do Mendeleeva.